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CURRENT DECISIONS
duction. 11 This trend toward liberality in allowing the deduction of
attorney's fees has its present culmination in Parker v. Commissioner,
which goes beyond Commissioner v. Tellier,12 and the earlier case of
Commissioner v. Heininger,3 where dleductions for legal expenses were
allowed despite criminal convictions.
The distinguishing factor in the Parker case is that the deduction is
allowed to a separate organization which paid the fees for the individual,
while at the same time the individual was allowed to exclude the value
of the expenses from his income. This result is due to the fact that the
individual and organization were so closely interconnected that they
were actually one, thus allowing the exclusion to the individual as well
as the organization. It has been the practice of the Internal Revenue
Service to separate an individual and an organization in determining the
proper allocation of income. It may be inferred from the present result
that legal fees are deductible in defending any criminal action against a
"prime functionary" where the relation between the organization
and the individual is so interconnected that the life of the organization
would become tenuous by an adverse judgment against the individual.
Joseph L. Howard
Constitutional Law-CIVIL LIBERTIES. In Adderley v. Florida,'
petitioners, Harriet Louise Adderley and thirty-one other persons,
apparently all students at Florida A. & M. University in Tallahassee,
were convicted by a jury in a joint trial in the County Judge's Court
of Leon County, Florida, on a charge of trespass upon the premises of
the county jail, with a malicious and mischievous intent, in violation of
section 821.18 of the Florida Statutes.2
11. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, S 212:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year . . . (3) in
connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.
Int. Rev. Reg., § 1.212 (1):
Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in connection with the determination,
collection, or refund of any tax, whether the taxing authority be Federal, State
or municipal, and whether the tax be income, estate, gift, property or any other
tax, are deductible. [Emphasis added.]
12. Supra note 8.
13. 320 U.S. 467 (1943), held deductions claimed by a dentist for lawyer's fees in de-
fending him on a criminal charge of fraud order of the Postmaster General, were upheld,
even though the dentist was convicted.
1. 87 S.Ct. 242 (1966).
2. FA. STAT. § 821.18 (1965), "Every trespass upon the property of another, com-
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The students had gone to the jail to demonstrate, and to protest the
arrest of other protesting students which had been made the previous
day. The county sheriff, after trying to persuade students to leave the
jail grounds, notified them that if they did not leave he would arrest
them for trespassing. Several students did leave, but petitioners remained
and were arrested. Petitioners' convictions were affirmed on appeal by
the Florida District Court of Appeals.8 They then applied to the
Supreme Court for certiorari "contending that, in view of petitioners'
purpose to protest against jail and other segregation policies, their con-
viction denied them 'rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due
process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.' "-
The Supreme Court held that the Florida Trespass Statute8 was not
void for vagueness and that the jury was authorized to find that the
State had proven every essential element of the crime as defined by the
Trial Court;' and that the conviction of the state offense thus defined
did not unconstitutionally deprive petitioners of their rights to freedom
of speech, press, assembly or petition under the First Amendment.7
Although in February 1966 the Court, in Browm v. Louisiana,8 by a
mitted with a 7malicious and mischievous intent, the punishment of which is not
specially provided for, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three months,
or by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars." (Emphasis added.)
3. Adderley v. Florida, 175 So.2d 249 (1965).
4. Supra note 1, at 244.
5. Supra note 2.
6. Supra note 4, at 245 n.2. "'Malicious' means wrongful.... The word 'malicious'
means that the wrongful act shall be done voluntarily, unlawfully, and without excuse
or justification. The word 'malicious' that is used in these affidavits does not necessarily
allege nor require the State to prove that the defendant had actual malice in his
mind at the time of the alleged trespass. Another way of stating the definition of
'malicious' is by 'malicious' is meant the act was done knowingly and willfully and
without any legal justification.
"'Mischievous,' which is also required, means that the alleged trespass shall be in-
cdined to cause petty and trivial trouble, annoyance and vexation to others in order for
you to find that the alleged trespass was committed with mischievous intent."
7. Supra note 4, at 247. Constitution of United States of America, Amendment I
states "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." These rights are protected by Amendment XIV
which says "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States ...
8. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
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3-1-1-4 distribution of opinions, come very close to upholding con-
victions of Southern Negro Demonstrators, Adderley is the first in-
stance in which convictions of Civil Rights demonstrators have been
affirmedY
Here petitioners contended that their case was controlled by the de-
cisions of Edwards v. South Carolina,' decided in 1963, and Cox v.
Louisiana," decided in 1965. In Edwards, Negro students assembled at
the site of the State Government and peacefully expressed their griev-
ances, by singing, to the Legislative Bodies, and to the citizens of South
Carolina. The students were arrested after refusing to disperse, and were
convicted of the common-law crime of breach of the peace. The Su-
preme Court, in reversing the convictions, held that to convict the
students of an offense so generalized as to be not susceptible of exact
definition, South Carolina infringed their rights of free speech, free
assembly and freedom to petition guaranteed by the First Amendment
and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.12 In the Cox case student
demonstrators were also convicted under a breach of the peace statute,13
and the thesis of the majority in overturning the convictions proceeded
on the same ground of vagueness as in Edwards. The court, however,
refused to follow these previous cases, distinguishing the present case
on two principal grounds. In the first place in Edwards the demonstra-
tors had gone to the State Capitol grounds to protest, and in Cox to the
Courthouse. In Adderley however, the demonstrators went to the prem-
ises of the county jail, and this, the court felt, distinguished Adderley
from the previous cases. "Traditionally, State Capitol grounds are open
to the public. Jails, built for security purposes, are not." 14 More im-
portantly, however, the Court held that the words "with a malicious
and mischievous intent" '5 do not make the Florida Statute so broad
9. The William & Mary Law Review, in its 1966 Constitutional Issues edition (Con-
stitutional Issues in the 1965 Term of the Supreme Court, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 49),
discussed the impact of the divided majority in Brown v. State of Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966), on civil liberties, and declared "Brown v. State of Louisiana may mark
the extreme in a pendulum swing of judicial persuasion." Adderley v. Florida seems
to confirm that declaration, and indicates, perhaps, that the pendulum may be swinging
back from the extreme position.
10. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
11. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
12. Supra note 10.
13. Supra note 11.
14. Supra note 4, at 244.
15. Supra note 2.
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as to be vague, as were the common-law breach of the peace charges
in Edwards and Cox. The Court held that "On the contrary, these
words narrow the scope of the offense .... The use of these terms in
the statute, instead of contributing to uncertainty and misunderstanding,
actually makes its meaning more understandable and clear." "I
In Brown v. Louisiana,17 the Supreme Court reversed convictions
under the same Louisiana Statute involved in Cox, supra. In Brown, five
young Negro males entered the adult reading room of a public library,
asked for a book which the library did not have, and then sat and stood
in the room as a protest against the segregation of the library. By a
3-1-1-4 distribution of opinions the Court narrowly overturned the
conviction of the protestors under the breach of the peace statute as
infringing upon their constitutional rights. In a strong dissenting opin-
ion, Mr. Justice Black distinguished Brown from previous cases by point-
ing out that "A tiny, branch, parish library, staffed by two women, is
not a department store as in Garner v. Louisiana,18 not a bus terminal as
in Taylor v. Louisiana,19 nor a public thoroughfare as in Edwards v.
South Carolina,2° and in Cox.21 "122 He went on to say "The holding
in this case makes it more necessary than ever that we stop and look
more closely at where we are going." '
Mr. Justice Black further declared "It is high time to challenge the
assumption in which too many people have too long acquiesced, that
groups that think they have been mistreated or that have actually been
mistreated have a constitutional right to use the public streets, buildings,
and property to protest whatever, wherever, whenever they want, with-
out regard to whom it may disturb." 24 It would appear that this same
rationale carried over to his opinion for the majority in Adderley.s
16. Supra note 4, at 245.
17. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
18. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
19. 370 U.S. 154 (1961).
20. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
21. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
22. Supra note 17, at 163.
23. Id. at 168.
24. Supra note 14, at 162.
25. Supra note 1, at 247: "The State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the petitioners' argument that they
had a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail custodian's objections,
because this 'area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only
"reasonable" but also particularly appropriate. . . .' Such an argument has as its major
[Vol. 8:447
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Whether Adderley represents a great break with the traditions of the
court, however, remains to be seen. Whether Mr. Justice Black's opinion
expressed in his dissent in Brown has been adopted by the majority of
the Court and carried forward in Adderley, or whether the majority
merely felt that the security requirements of a jail made it necessary to
distinguish Adderley from all other demonstration cases, is a question
which will surely be presented in the future. It can be said, however,
that the Court has posted a "no trespassing" warning on public prop-
erty not traditionally open to the public, and the decision may indicate
a less tolerant attitude developing in the Court toward demonstrators.
Glenn 1. Sedam, Jr.
unarticulated premise the assumption that people who want to propagandize protests or
views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they
please."
